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In an impressive display of questionable timing and priorities, the US President may
just have rung in the first round of a new space age. While “non-viral” news currently
fly under the radar, the legal and policy implications of the newest ‘Executive
Order on Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space
Resources’, quite literally, go above and beyond. In response to a recent post on
the subject by Michael Friedl and Maximilian Gartner, this post weighs in on the
newest developments in international outer space law and highlights their potential
for international progress, but also their risks of inequality and conflict.
The relevant international law revisited
Before discussing the US executive order, a brief overview of the international legal
regime on space resource recovery is due. When it comes to resource extraction
and utilization in outer space, two treaties must be considered. The first one is
the so-called Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967. While its Article I prominently
declares that outer space “shall be free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind” and that the exploration and use of outer space “shall be
the province of all mankind”, Article II prohibits the national appropriation of outer
space “by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.”
The second treaty is the so-called Moon Agreement (MA) of 1979. This considerably
younger treaty’s regime for space resources (the OST was even concluded before
the moon landing) can be distinguished from the OST’s on two major bases.
First, the MA rules are significantly more specific than those of the OST. While
reiterating the OST’s provisions on the freedom of use and non-appropriation of
outer space, Article 11 MA specifies that “[t]he moon and its natural resources are
the common heritage of mankind” (in (1)) and that “[n]either the surface nor the
subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall
become property of any State, international intergovernmental or non- governmental
organization, national organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural
person” (in (3)).
Second, the MA has significantly fewer states parties than the OST. Ninety-one
fewer, to be specific. Besides France and India, who have not ratified the MA yet,
no major spacefaring nations are among the 18 member states of the MA. Many
scholars identify a link between the restrictively precise language of the MA and its
unpopularity among (spacefaring) states.
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The paralyzing legal uncertainty for states and private entities resulting from the
dichotomy of this legal regime has been explained in greater detail by the previous
post. Summed up, it is unclear, what exactly is covered by the prohibition of national
appropriation “by any other means” and in how far the non-appropriation clause
applies to the acquisition of property. Even though private entities are not directly
bound by the two treaties in question, they are not willing to undertake expensive
mining ventures into outer space without certainty that states may and in fact will
recognize property rights over extracted space resources.
While the previous post focused on the legal uncertainty revolving around resource
extraction in outer space, this contribution aims to direct attention to the one thing
which appears to be crystal clear about the OST’s non-appropriation regime. In light
of the OST’s focus on the benefit of all states and mankind in general, as well as
the Cold War circumstances of its conclusion, we can confidently state: Outer space
is not simply up for grabs for those states which happen to have the necessary
technical and financial capabilities. The OST wants to prevent power struggles over
any part of outer space. Consequently, the legal status of outer space in general is
considered to be res communis, a global commons.
The new executive order
The new executive order, however, is apparently animated with a different spirit. It
gives reason for hope and skepticism and the same time, depending on whether we
look at its approach towards space resources or at its attitude towards outer space
as such. As far as space resource extraction is concerned, the executive order
follows the footsteps of the so-called ‘Space Resource Exploration and Utilization
Act of 2015’, which allows US citizens to “possess, own, transport, use, and sell
the […] space resource obtained in accordance with applicable law” (§ 51303). The
law passed under the Obama administration provoked considerable backlash in the
international outer space law community, as it poked the beehive that is the legality
of property rights under Article II OST. Yet, many scholars consider the acquisition
of property rights over space resources (unlike property over extraterrestrial real
estate) permissible under the non-appropriation clause. The argument goes that a
global commons prevents states from appropriating the commons itself, but not its
resources, similar to the nautical idea of “owning the fish, not the sea”. Irrespective of
the merits of such analogies (after all, fishing on the high seas has been a common
practice long before any international law of the sea, while no space resource has
been commercially extracted yet) resource/property acquisition in – not over – global
commons appears conceivable.
The good news is that this time the US space policy ostensibly favors international
cooperation. According to the executive order, the Secretary of State “shall take all
appropriate actions to encourage international support for the public and private
recovery and use of resources in outer space”. This initiative is intended to reduce
legal uncertainty relating to space resource extraction. As the technical feasibility of
commercial space resource extraction inches closer, the dated space law regime
would benefit from updates allowing for the safe and reasonable realization of outer
space’s enormous scientific, economic and developmental potential for humanity as
a whole.
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At the same time, the executive order rings alarm bells, when we look at its
categorization of outer space. The order expressly states that the US do not view
outer space as a global commons and that the purpose of the encouragement
of international cooperation is to accrue support for this view – consistent with
applicable law which, at the time, includes the OST. This small statement begs one
big question: If outer space is not a global commons, what is it?
The international law category left would be terra or res nullius, i.e. land or a thing
that is nobody’s. On the flipside, it would be open to appropriation by anybody. First
come, first served. It is obvious why this would appeal to the US and their potent
space companies. At the same time, it is obvious that this conception of outer space
does not resonate well with the object and purpose behind the non-appropriation
clause on the one hand and the overall inclusive and cooperative nature of the
OST as a whole, on the other hand. Article XV OST does allow for amendments
and, more generally, states are free to subsequently agree on the interpretation
of a treaty or the application of its provisions. Whether such agreements which
would undermine the conciliatory purpose of the OST at the expense of the rest of
humanity can be made in good faith is highly doubtful, to say the least. Especially, if
one agrees that the concept of “global commons” does not necessarily prohibit the
extraction and subsequent appropriation and utilization of its resources per se.
In conclusion, attempts to reduce legal uncertainty are generally laudable. The
overall direction of the current US approach is, however, worrying. As space
resource extraction is about to become feasible, it is important that states, while
regulating resource extraction from a global commons, do not do away with
the global commons status itself. At the same time, given that the current legal
uncertainty does in fact slow down humanity’s progress on and through the final
frontier, one must hope that the US attempt – as egoistic as it may be – will at least
instigate a long overdue discussion, so that resource conflicts in space do not one
day turn into military ones
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